The Human Condition

Chapter 11 introduces Arendt’s distinction between labor and work, a difference preserved in both ancient and modern European languages. Yet as in her preceding discussions of the distinctions vita activa/vita contemplativa and private/public/social, Arendt claims that the difference between labor and work has been largely underexamined and requires detailed analysis.

Arendt has taken the title of the chapter from Locke’s Second Treatise on Government. According to Arendt, it suggests the ancient Greek distinction between the bodily labor of the slave and the handiwork of the craftsperson. This corresponds to her use of the Latin terms animal laborans (laboring animal) and homo faber (man or human being the maker). Unlike the craftsperson, who produces an enduring, valuable product (think of the phrase “work of art”), the labor of the slave is defined by its consumable, transitory nature (87). Labor dissolves into the temporary fulfillment of a biological imperative—cleaning, eating, birthing—that will inevitably need to be met again in the future. Work, on the other hand, creates a distinct object or artifact beyond the demands of pure necessity. The process of labor is cyclical, and the process of work is linear.

According to Arendt, even the ancient Greeks and Romans failed to closely observe the distinction between labor and work, though there are fluctuations in their evaluations of whether slaves and craftspeople had different rights.